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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW

STEPHEN C. THAMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, confessions of guilt have been the “best evidence in the whole
world”1 in all systems of criminal justice, whether characterized as
“adversarial” and rooted in the English Common Law,2 or “inquisitorial” and
based on Continental European traditions founded in Roman and Canon law.3
The “formal rules of evidence” in Continental European inquisitorial systems
expressly provided for torture of suspects caught in flagrante or when
circumstantial evidence indicated a strong suspicion of guilt.4 While torture
was infrequently used in Common Law England,5 criminal suspects were
routinely interrogated by justices of the peace under a procedure authorized by
statute.6 Incriminating statements were admitted through the testimony of the
justice of the peace at a time when criminal defendants were incompetent to

*Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1. This expression comes from the Pre-1864 Laws of the Russian Empire (1857 ed.),
quoted in SAMUEL KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THEIR
HISTORY AND OPERATION 610 (1970).
2. For a discussion of systematic pressures on the accused to speak in early English
criminal procedure, see John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure:
The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 88 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, The
Privilege].
3. Under the French Ordinance of 1670, the confession was proof “par excellence.” “[O]f
all the proofs which can be had in criminal cases, the accused’s confession is the strongest and
most certain; consequently that proof is sufficient. . . . Such a confession is the most complete
proof that could be wished for.” ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO FRANCE 262 (1913).
4. See Constitutio Criminalis Carolina §§ 23, 25-27. For a translation, see JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 273-75 app. B (1974) [hereinafter
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME].
5. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE
ANCIENT RÉGIME 138 (1977) [hereinafter LANGBEIN, TORTURE].
6. Marian Bail Statute, 1554-55, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (Eng.), reprinted in LANGBEIN,
PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 4, at 256-57.
581
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testify.7 There was considerable authority at the time that the privilege against
self-incrimination in England was meant to protect only against compelled
testimony under oath and did not apply to questioning by justices of the peace,
which was not under oath.8 Although the institution of questioning suspects by
justices of the peace in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England has been
characterized as “a system of pretrial inquiry that was devoted to pressuring
the accused to incriminate himself,”9 the use of coercion, torture, threats or
promises by interrogators was generally considered to render a statement
involuntary and in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.10
Indeed, it was perhaps foolish for suspects to refuse to give a statement to
the justices of the peace, because they were incompetent to testify at trial and
did not have lawyers to speak for them until well into the Nineteenth
Century.11 Since criminal defendants were often facing the death penalty even
in non-homicide cases, the only way to appeal to the jury’s mercy was to speak
and hope the jury would exercise “pious perjury” even in the event the
defendant’s guilt could be adequately proven.12 In some situations, confessing
one’s guilt to the jury could even lead to mitigation or acquittal.13 Procedural
strictures on the accused, such as threatened Draconian punishments coupled
with the hopes of mitigation and mercy exercised first by the jury, and later by
the judge in the event of a guilty verdict, are at the root of English and
American plea-bargaining. These strictures have been characterized as the
Common Law answer to the Continental European institution of torture.14 The
English system of pretrial examination by justices of the peace was
transplanted to American soil and prevailed until the late Nineteenth Century,

7. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in R.H.
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 194 (1997) [hereinafter Alschuler].
8. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 186-87, 193.
9. Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 2, at 91.
10. On the blurry distinction between the inherent pressures of pre-trial interrogation by
justices of the peace and the prohibition of torture in Colonial America, see Eben Moglen, The
Privilege in British North America: The Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in R.H.
HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 118-21 (1997) [hereinafter Moglen].
11. Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 2, at 83-87. Langbein calls this the “accused
speaks” form of trial. Id.
12. Id. at 93-94.
13. Id. In Tsarist Russia, which had a jury system from 1864 to 1917, studies indicated that
juries would be more likely to acquit or mitigate the sentence if the defendant gave a full judicial
confession at trial. See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Spain and
Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 246 n.70 (1999) [hereinafter Thaman, Europe’s New
Jury Systems].
14. See generally John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3
(1978).
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as did the incompetence of defendants to testify in their own defense.15
However, the Americans brought with them from England a great reverence
for the privilege against self-incrimination, which stemmed from the fights of
the Puritans and other dissidents against the inquisitorial courts of Star
Chamber and the High Commission.16 The Americans eventually incorporated
this protection into the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
provides: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”17
Inasmuch as there was no right to appeal either convictions or acquittals in
the United States until the end of the Nineteenth Century,18 there was no
mechanism for judicial enforcement of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Early cases do indicate, however, that coercive questioning by police19 was an
area controlled by the Fifth Amendment, and statements that were the product
of such coercion could be excluded.20 There appear to be two constants
throughout American and European jurisprudence since torture was abolished
on the European Continent.21 First, genuinely involuntary confessions
obtained by means of torture or other force, violence, deception, promises or
threats were in violation of the law and subject to a rigid exclusionary rule.
Second, the police and other investigative authorities continued to use such
tactics to induce confessions and admissions on the part of criminal suspects.
In America, the U.S. Supreme Court was prevented by its own
jurisprudence from addressing the problem of coerced confessions under the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because it had not yet
recognized that the amendment was binding on the states.22 It thus fashioned a
“due process” test for the voluntariness of confessions and, between 1936 and
1964, decided thirty-five confession cases arising from questionable police

15. See Moglen, supra note 10, at 114-17; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 198-99.
16. See Moglen, supra note 10, at 128-38 (noting that the high principles relating to the trials
of the dissidents were ignored in trials of common criminals).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 88 (1978).
19. The reputation of law enforcement in the early Twentieth Century was described by
Justice Day in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction
by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after
subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the
Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are
charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. at 392.
20. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 557-58 (1897).
21. Judicial torture was abolished on the European Continent, by and large, in the mid-tolate Eighteenth Century. See LANGBEIN, TORTURE, supra note 5, at 10.
22. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 93 (1908).
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tactics in interrogating suspects in state trials.23 These cases included out-andout torture,24 excessive length of interrogation,25 oppressive jail conditions
used to pressure the suspect,26 and threats of violence and other undesired
repercussions.27
When the U.S. Supreme Court finally recognized that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was binding on the states,28
the question of police interrogation of jailed suspects was again addressed in
explicit Fifth Amendment terms. In a 5-to-4 decision in Miranda v. Arizona,29
the U.S. Supreme Court devised procedures “to assure that the individual is
accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be
compelled to incriminate himself.”30 The Court, noting that “police violence
and the ‘third degree’ flourished” in the 1930s, stressed the primarily
psychological strategies used by police to induce confessions at the time and
referred to “various police manuals and texts” describing these tactics.31 After
finding that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation
of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” the Supreme
Court enunciated what are now known throughout the world as the “Miranda
Warnings.” The Miranda warnings are a prerequisite to any in-custody
questioning by police officials:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
23. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 619
(6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter SALTZBURG & CAPRA].
24. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936) (including among the various
methods of torture repeated whippings and hanging from a tree).
25. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. l43, 150 (l944) (subjecting the defendant to thirtysix hours of interrogation).
26. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52-53 (l949) (involving sustained police pressure);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403 (l945) (stripping defendant naked); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507 (l963) (holding defendant incommunicado and denying phone
calls).
27. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958) (involving denial of food and threat
of mob violence); Lynum v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 533 (l963) (threatening to cut off financial aid
to children); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 536 (1961) (threatening to bring in arthritic wife
for questioning).
28. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating privilege against selfincrimination through due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
31. Id. at 446, 448.
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however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.32

The Miranda decision was a compromise between what one commentator
called “two incompatible readings” of the Fifth Amendment guarantee: (1) that
the “privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will,’” and (2) that the privilege “does not protect an accused’s ability to
remain silent but instead protects him only from improper methods of
interrogation.”33 The Miranda Court still allowed custodial interrogations by
police officers without the presence of counsel, despite its finding of the
inherent oppressive conditions attendant therein, as long as the person
interrogated had been properly admonished and had waived the right to remain
silent and the right to counsel.34 The Court also limited the requirement of
warnings to custody cases.35
Miranda was controversial when decided even though the majority pointed
out that the most professional police force in the country, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, had been using Miranda-like admonitions for many years and
had not found it to hamper criminal investigations.36 Not only was it a narrow
5-to-4 decision, but the U.S. Congress tried to overrule the decision in
legislation it passed two years later.37 This decision would have returned to the
“voluntariness” test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in its preincorporation jurisprudence from 1936 to 1964. The statute was ignored by
U.S. Attorneys and federal judges alike until, after prodding by Justice Scalia
in a concurring opinion,38 the issue of the constitutionality of the federal statute
32. Id. at 467.
33. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 181-82.
34. The Court also indicated that the police need not “have a ‘station house lawyer’ present
at all times to advise prisoners” and implicitly allowed the police not to summon a “courtappointed” lawyer even if one was requested as long as they did not interrogate the suspect.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
35. Id. at 478.
36. Id. at 483. An English law of 1848, Jervis’s Act, provided that all prisoners, whether
before or during trial, had to be admonished of their right to remain silent and that anything they
did say could be used in evidence. See Henry E. Smith, The Modern Privilege: Its NineteenthCentury Origins, in R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 169-70 (1997).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
38. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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reached the Supreme Court. In Dickerson v. United States,39 the Supreme
Court affirmed the rooting of the Miranda warnings in the Fifth Amendment
and distanced itself from earlier caselaw which had called into question the
constitutionality thereof and had referred to the warnings as “prophylactic” and
“not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.”40
Between 1966 and 2000, however, the Supreme Court handed down
several rulings that called into question the constitutionality of the Miranda
warnings. These decisions have clarified and limited the applicability of the
warnings and the remedy of exclusion of statements acquired in violation of
Miranda. The Supreme Court has ruled that statements taken in violation of
Miranda may nevertheless be used by the prosecution to impeach the
defendant if he testifies at trial in a manner contrary to his previous
statements.41 The Court has also allowed the police and prosecution to use
leads gleaned from statements taken in violation of Miranda to gather other
evidence, even if the statement itself will not be usable at trial.42 The Court
has even allowed the prosecution to use statements taken after proper Miranda
warnings, although the police had interviewed the defendant earlier in violation
of Miranda and had induced incriminating responses.43
The result of these rulings is that police departments routinely interrogate
suspects without giving them Miranda warnings, knowing that the information
can be used for leads to impeach a testifying defendant (thus conceivably
deterring him or her from testifying), or can be used if a subsequent statement
is made confirming the earlier statement following proper warnings.44 The
U.S. Supreme Court has also condoned explicit deception employed by the
police to induce suspects to talk to police officers or their agents. Undercover
police officers or police informants may, for instance, interrogate an
incarcerated suspect without giving him any warnings in his jail cell as long as
the suspect is not aware that the interrogator is working for the police.45 The
police or jailers may also refuse to tell an incarcerated suspect that he is
represented by a lawyer and even prevent the lawyer from gaining access to the
suspect.46 Although police officers must cease their attempts to interrogate a
suspect if he or she invokes the right to remain silent or the right to counsel,
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the police may come back at a later time

39. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
40. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
41. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
42. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974).
43. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
44. See California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1049-50 (9th Cir.
1999); People v. Peevy, 953 P.2d 1212, 1214 (Cal. 1998).
45. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990).
46. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW

587

if the suspect has only invoked the right to remain silent.47 The police may not
return to attempt to gain a waiver if the suspect invokes the right to counsel
unless the suspect voluntarily initiates the subsequent conversation.48
The U.S. Supreme Court has fashioned much stricter rules for police
interrogations after the defendant has been officially charged. Prior to
Miranda, the Supreme Court had held that neither police nor their undercover
operatives could question an indicted suspect, even if the defendant was out of
custody and did not realize that his interrogator was a police agent.49 This
seemingly ironclad rule that there be no police interrogation of an indicted
defendant without counsel being present has, however, been somewhat
loosened in later Supreme Court caselaw. The Court has allowed, for instance,
the surreptitious placing of “jailplants,” perhaps undercover police informants,
into jail cells with indicted defendants, as long as they do not actively question
the indicted person.50 It has also allowed police interrogation of indicted
defendants following proper Miranda warnings as long as the indicted prisoner
has not been arraigned or requested counsel.51 Finally, the U.S. Supreme
Court has allowed questioning of indicted prisoners about crimes other than
those for which they have been indicted.52
This article will discuss the protections afforded criminal suspects and
defendants overseas when faced with interrogation by police, prosecutors,
investigating magistrates53 or judges of the investigation.54 It will compare the

47. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1975).
48. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). It is important to note that the Supreme
Court has held that “reinitiation” may be found where a suspect asks such things as: “What’s
going to happen to me now?” See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983). The
Edwards rule even applies to the interrogation of uncharged suspects as well as to other crimes
for which they are not under arrest. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988).
49. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
50. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272 (1980); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,
460 (1986).
51. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 297 (1988). Compare Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625, 626 (1986), in which the defendant had been arraigned and requested counsel.
52. See McNeill v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991). Even “jailplants” may be active in
their surreptitious interrogations of incarcerated, indicted defendants about such “other crimes.”
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
53. The “investigating magistrate” is a legally trained official who is a member of the
judiciary and is entrusted with investigating serious criminal cases in a number of overseas
jurisdictions. The main countries emphasized in this study that still have investigating
magistrates are France, Spain and the Netherlands. This figure is generally derived from the
French juge d’instruction, the dominant investigating official in the old European inquisitorial
systems. For a discussion of this key figure in the inquisitorial mode of criminal investigation,
see JEAN PRADEL, PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 26-31 (9th ed. 1997) [hereinafter PRADEL].
54. I use the term “judges of the investigation” for the judge who has competence during
pretrial proceedings to authorize invasions of privacy and personal integrity (searches, seizures,
wiretaps, etc.), and to conduct depositions or interrogate defendants in countries which have
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admonitions given to such suspects with those provided in the Miranda
decision and discuss their constitutional, or statutory status. It will further
discuss when such admonitions must be given, to what extent the police or
other officials may re-admonish after the right to silence or counsel has been
invoked, and whether statements taken in violation of such admonitions or the
fruits thereof may be used in court, or for the purpose of conducting further
investigations or prosecuting third parties. In a brief conclusion, this article
assesses what we can learn from this comparison of U.S. law with that of other
democratic countries with systems derived from the inquisitorial model. The
comparison will focus primarily on England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia
and Spain.
II. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN EUROPE
This study will not concern itself with the constitutional provisions and
laws protecting suspects and defendants against being coerced to give
statements by law enforcement officials. The use of torture as a means of
gathering evidence was abolished long ago in Europe55 and is, along with other
cruel and inhuman treatment, prohibited by national constitutions56 and
international human rights conventions.57 Any use of such measures would in
all civilized countries lead to exclusion of any statement obtained thereby.58

abolished the “investigating magistrate,” such as Germany and Italy. This term was used by the
French Commission on Criminal Justice and Human Rights in its 1991 report. See COMMISSION
JUSTICE PÉNALE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME, LA MISE EN ÉTAT DES AFFAIRES PÉNALES: RAPPORTS
31 (Fr. 1991) [hereinafter LA MISE EN ÉTAT DES AFFAIRES PÉNALES].
55. See supra note 21.
56. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] art. 15 [hereinafter C.E.-Spain], translated by
author from JULIO MUERZA ESPARZA, LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL Y OTRAS NORMAS
PROCESALES 15-25 (1998) [hereinafter MUERZA ESPARZA]; COSTITUZIONE DE LA REPUBLICA
ITALIANA [COST.] art. 13 para. 4, art. 27 para. 2 [hereinafter COST.-Italy], translated by author
from GIUSTINO GATTI ET AL., CODICE PÉNALE E DI PROCÉDURA PÉNALE 9-49 (Giuridiche
Simone ed., 1999) [hereinafter GATTI ET AL.]; KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII [KONST.
RF 1993] art. 21(2) [hereinafter KONST. RF-RUSSIA], translated by author from B.N. TOPORNIN
ET AL., KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII: KOMMENTARIY (1994) [hereinafter TOPORNIN
ET AL.].
57. See UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 5; INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS; CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT art. 7. For a collection of these texts,
see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF UNITED NATIONS NORMS AND STANDARDS 21-39
(1994) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI]; EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS art. 3 (1950), available at http://conventions.coe.int/
treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm [hereinafter ECHR].
58. For example, the German Code of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(1) The suspect’s freedom to make decisions or exercise his will may not be impaired
through maltreatment, fatigue, physical intervention, the administration of substances,
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Furthermore, the study will not deal with procedures for compelling a
criminal suspect to testify under oath, a compulsion enforced by the threat of a
prosecution for perjury or contempt.59 Neither police, prosecutors,
investigating magistrates nor judges of the investigation may compel a suspect
to declare against his own interests in England or on the European Continent
unless a kind of immunity is granted.60 Indeed, in most continental European
countries an accused or a criminal defendant61 is never placed under oath,
whether he is declaring to a public prosecutor, a magistrate or judge, or in a
trial before judge, jury or mixed court.62
Despite the fact that no compulsion is allowed and no oath administered,
continental European jurisdictions used to require the investigating authority to

through torture, deception or hypnosis. Force may only be applied to the extent allowed
by the law of criminal procedure. The threat of any measure which is not applicable
according to the rules, or the promise of a benefit not provided by law are prohibited; (2)
Measures which impair the suspect’s capacity for memory or the capability of exercising
insight are not permitted; (3) The prohibitions of paragraphs 1 and 2 apply regardless of
the consent of the suspect. Statements which are made as a result of the violation of this
prohibition may not be used, even if the suspect agrees to said use.
STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [StPO] § 136a [hereinafter StPO-GERMANY], translated by author from
THEODOR KLEINKNECHT & LUTZ MEYER-GOßNER, STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG (43d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER]. See also CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE
[C.P.P.] § 64(3) [hereinafter C.P.P.-ITALY], translated by author from GATTI ET AL., supra note
56.
For the detailed English legislation regulating the conditions of custodial interrogation in
England, see Code of Practice C. Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, §§ 12.2-12.5, 12.7
[hereinafter PACE-England], cited in STEPHEN SEABROOKE & JOHN SPRACK, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK (1996) [hereinafter SEABROOKE &
SPRACK].
59. Such compulsion, called the “cruel trilemma” by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Harbors, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), forces a guilty suspect to risk
either self-incrimination and punishment, contempt or perjury prosecution.
60. According to Section 2 of England’s Criminal Justice Act of 1987, it is a crime,
punishable by up to six-months imprisonment, to refuse to answer questions pursuant to an
investigation by the Serious Fraud Office. The answers to such questions may not be used by the
prosecution except to impeach the defendant when he testifies differently at trial. Similar powers
to compel testimony are enjoyed by the Department of Trade and Industry Inspectors under other
legislation. See THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE: REPORT 56-57 (1993)
[hereinafter RCCJ REPT.].
61. I shall use the term “suspect” for a person arrested by the police but against whom
criminal proceedings have not yet been officially initiated through the filing of a complaint. The
term “accused” shall refer to someone against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated,
but who has not yet been held to answer in the trial court. The term “defendant” shall refer to a
person who has been bound over for trial.
62. Cf. StPO-GERMANY § 60(2); LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL [L.E.CRIM.] § 387,
[hereinafter L.E.CRIM-SPAIN], translated by author from MUERZA ESPARZA, supra note 56.
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interrogate the suspect-accused.63 These jurisdictions considered it to be a
protection for accused persons to be able to speak and give their sides of the
story.64 Indeed, the old continental European statutes seldom contained
explicit references to any right of the accused to remain silent, but rather
emphasized, his or her right to make a statement.65
Despite the fact that Spain is still using a Code of Criminal Procedure from
1882, Germany from 1877, France from 1955 and Russia from 1966,
amendments and new constitutions (Germany in 1949, Spain in 1978 and
Russia in 1993) have led to substantial alterations of the old inquisitorial mode
of questioning suspects and the accused. The Spanish Constitution provides in
Article 24, Section 2 that all persons have the “right . . . not to declare against
themselves and not to confess guilt . . . .”66 It further provides in Article 17,
Section 3:
[E]very detained person shall be informed immediately and in a
comprehensible form, of his rights and the reasons for his detention, without
being obligated to make a declaration. The assistance of a lawyer is
guaranteed to the detained person during police and judicial investigative
measures in the terms the law establishes.67

The Russian Constitution of 1993 contains similar guarantees.68

63. L.E.CRIM-SPAIN § 385; StPO-GERMANY § 163a(1). See also KLEINKNECHT & MEYERGOßNER, supra note 58, at 612.
64. PRADEL, supra note 53, at 357. The French have traditionally viewed the involvement
of an independent judge as being a better safeguard than an abstract right of silence. See Richard
Vogler, Criminal Procedure in France, in JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 31 (1996) [hereinafter Vogler]. American criminal defendants probably also view
the constitutional right to indictment by grand jury, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, as being a mixed blessing.
65. See UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS RF [UPK RF] §§ 46, 54 (October 27, 1960)
[hereinafter UPK RF-RUSSIA], translated by author from 2 SBORNIK KODEKSOV ROSSIYSKOY
FEDERATSII (1999). In outlining the rights of accuseds and suspects, the Russian Code of
Criminal Procedure mentions the rights “to know what he is being accused of,” to “give
explanations as to the accusation presented him,” and to “present evidence.” The Code does not
mention a right to silence. Cf. L.E.CRIM-SPAIN §§ 396, 400.
66. See MUERZA ESPARZA, supra note 56, at 18.
67. Id. at 16-17. As a result of these constitutional provisions the old inquisitorial provisions
of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure, such as Section 387, which has the investigating
magistrate “exhort” suspects “to tell the truth” in a “precise, clear and truthful manner,” have
been ruled to be unconstitutional. See VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA ET AL., DERECHO PROCESAL
PENAL 395-96 (1996) [hereinafter VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA ET AL.].
68. Article 51(1) of the Russian Constitution provides: “No one is obliged to be a witness
against himself . . . .” Article 49(2) provides: “The defendant is not obliged to prove his
innocence.” Article 48(2) provides: “Every person arrested, preventively detained or accused of
having committed a crime has the right to make use of the services of a lawyer (defense counsel)
from the moment, respectively, of arrest, preventive detention or the filing of a criminal
complaint.” See TOPORNIN ET AL., supra note 56, at 260, 265 & 274.
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III. ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS BEFORE POLICE INTERROGATION IN
COMPARATIVE LAW
A.

Introduction

Given that modern constitutions and criminal procedure codes guarantee
both the right to remain silent and the protection against techniques used to
compel self-incrimination, it remains to be seen how these rights are
interpreted in the context of police interrogations. The police play different
roles in different criminal justice systems. In common law systems such as
those in England and the United States, the police are the main criminal
investigators and, as such, the main interrogators of criminal suspects. In postinquisitorial systems the primary duties of the police are to arrest suspects,
secure the crime scene and evidence and interview eyewitnesses.69 The case is
then turned over to the public prosecutor who, depending on the country and
the type of crime investigated, either investigates the case herself or turns it
over to an investigating magistrate,70 or sends the case immediately to the trial
court pursuant to procedures providing for expedited, abbreviated or simplified
trials.71
If the public prosecutor or the investigating magistrate then agrees to
initiate criminal proceedings, he or she has the power or even the duty to again
examine witnesses and to interrogate the accused. In nearly all continental
European systems the police are permitted to interrogate the suspect before
turning the case over to the official investigator. Often the role of the official
investigator (whether public prosecutor or investigating magistrate) the judge
of the investigation is to give the accused a chance to either confirm or retract
the confession or admission given to the police. While the official investigator
may delegate the judicial police to conduct further investigative measures
through what is called a rogatory commission, this often does not involve
interrogation of the accused.72
Of special significance on the European continent is French procedure,
which allows the police, prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings, to hold
a suspect for up to forty-eight hours in what is called “watched custody” or
69. See C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 347-55, StPO-GERMANY § 163(1), L.E.CRIM-SPAIN § 282.
70. See C.P.P.-ITALY § 347; StPO-GERMANY § 163(2); L.E.CRIM-SPAIN §§ 284, 286; CODE
DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] §§ 54-57 [hereinafter C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE], translated by
author, unless otherwise noted, from CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE (Dalloz ed., 42d ed. 2001).
71. For some comments on the Italian and French procedures, see Stephen C. Thaman,
Symposium on Prosecuting Transnational Crimes: Cross-Cultural Insights for the Former Soviet
Union, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 5-9 (2000) (commenting on issues of plea-bargaining
and witness immunity).
72. In Italy, the public prosecutor may delegate the judicial police to do interrogations when
the suspect is out of custody and a lawyer is present. These interrogations must be proceeded by
admonitions of the right to silence and other rights. C.P.P.-ITALY § 370(1).
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garde à vue.73 Amendments to the French Penal Code in May 2000, however,
have greatly expanded the rights accorded suspects during garde à vue.74
What follows is an examination of the protective safeguards antecedent to
police questioning in key European jurisdictions and a discussion of any
additional safeguards provided during the official interrogations by judges or
prosecutors that follow.
B.

Admonitions Required Prior to Police Interrogation
1.

Italy

The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 contains the most radical
protections for criminal suspects when confronted with interrogation, whether
by police, public prosecutors or judicial authorities. In general, a suspect must
always be admonished as to the right to remain silent, regardless of who is
doing the questioning.75 The rules governing interrogations by the judicial
police, who are only authorized to gather so-called summary information,
provide:
2. Before gathering the summary information, the judicial police invite the
accused to name a defense lawyer or, where this is not done, to proceed
according to the provisions of Section 97(3) [relating to official appointment of
lawyers].
3. The summary information must be gathered in the presence of the defense
lawyer, whom the judicial police must give timely notice. The defense lawyer
is obliged to be present when the procedure is conducted.
4. If the defense lawyer is not located or does not appear, the judicial police
request the public prosecutor to proceed according to Section 97(4) [relating to
official appointment of a lawyer].
5. At the scene of the crime or in emergency situations the officials of the
judicial police may, even in the absence of a defense lawyer, gather from the
accused, even if he has been arrested in flagrante . . . information and tips
useful for achieving the immediate goals of the investigation.
6. No record or use may be made of the information and tips gathered in the
absence of defense counsel at the scene of the crime or in emergency situations
pursuant to paragraph five.

73. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 77, para. 1.
74. Law No. 2000-516 of June 5, 2000, J.O. Num. 138, June 16, 2000, p. 9038 (reinforcing
the protection of the presumption of innocence and the rights of the victim).
75. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 64(3), 65(2).
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7. The judicial police may also receive spontaneous declarations from the
accused, but they may not be used in the trial, except pursuant to the provisions
of Article 503(3) [relating to impeachment].76

In Italy, not only must the suspect be advised of the right to remain silent, but
any statement taken in the absence of counsel may not be used in court.
Therefore, the suspect-accused is not a source of evidence for the prosecution.
According to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, during any interrogation:
“the person is then invited to explain to the extent he deems it useful for his
defense . . . .”77
The institutional mistrust of the police as gatherers of evidence evinced by
the Italian legislature in the Code of Criminal Procedure was apparent
elsewhere. Another provision of the Code prevents police from testifying in
court as to prior statements they had taken even when offered as prior
inconsistent statements to impeach a testifying witness.78 The advisement of
the right to remain silent also applies, of course, to interrogations by the public
prosecutor79 and to interrogations by the judge of the investigation.80
2.

Spain

The Spanish legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1978.
These amendments made the code provisions conform to the aforementioned
constitutional provisions81 and transformed Spain’s formerly inquisitorial
approach to the interrogation of suspects and accuseds. The result was the
following section prescribing the admonitions that must be given to suspectsaccuseds under arrest or preventive detention:
Every person detained or imprisoned will be informed in a comprehensible
mode and immediately of the acts of which he is accused and the reasons for
the deprivation of his liberty, as well as the rights he possesses, especially the
following:
(a) The right to remain silent and not to speak if he does not want to, and not to
respond to any of the questions which are formulated, or to state that he only
wants to declare in front of a judge.

76. C.P.P.-ITALY § 350(2)–(7).
77. C.P.P.-ITALY § 65(1) para.1.
78. C.P.P.-ITALY § 195(4) provides: “The officials and agents of the judicial police may not
testify to the content of declarations acquired from witnesses.” However, this provision was
declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court. See Corte cost., sez. un., 31 jan.
1992, n.24, Giur. It. 37, 114.
79. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 294(6), 364, 388.
80. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 294(4), 302, 391; see generally Vittorio Grevi, Diritto al silenzio ed
esigenze cautelari nella disciplina della libertà personale dell’imputato, in LIBERTÀ PERSONALE
E RICERCA DELLA PROVA NELL’ATTUALE ASSETTO DELLE INDAGINI PRELIMINARI 9-10 (1995).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 67.
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(b) The right not to give a statement against oneself and not to confess guilt.
(c) The right to designate a lawyer and to request his presence to help during
the police and judicial interrogations and to intervene in any identification
procedure no matter what its object. If the detained person or prisoner does
not designate a lawyer, one will be officially designated.82

Although an accused in Spain has a right to have counsel present during an
interrogation by the investigating magistrate, the Spanish Constitutional Court
has ruled that the accused may waive this right if he is not in custody and has
been properly admonished.83
3.

Germany

In 1964, two years before the Miranda decision, the German Code of
Criminal Procedure was amended to provide for the following admonitions,
which apply to interrogations by a judge, a prosecutor or the police.84
At the beginning of the first interrogation the accused must be notified as to the
act which has been attributed to him and which penal provisions are
implicated. He must be advised, that the law permits him, either to respond to
the accusation or to say nothing in relation to the case, and at any time, even
before his interrogation, to ask questions of a named defense lawyer. He must
also be advised, that he can move to introduce particular items of evidence to
exonerate himself. In appropriate cases the accused should be advised that he
can give a written statement.85

Unlike in Italy and Spain, however, a suspect-accused in Germany has no right
to have his lawyer present during police interrogation.86 During interrogations
by the public prosecutor or the judge of the investigation, however, the
defendant has a right to have his lawyer present.87

82. L.E.CRIM.-SPAIN § 520(2)(a-c).
83. S.T.C., Dec. 13, 1999 (10 ACTUALIDAD PENAL, NO. 10, 405).
84. See Claus Roxin, Über die Reform des deutschen Strafprozeßrechts, in FESTSCHRIFT
FÜR GERD JAUCH ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAG 184 (l990) [hereinafter Roxin].
85. StPO-GERMANY § 136(1); Section 163(4) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure
makes Section 136(1) explicitly applicable to the first interrogation of a suspect by police
officers. German courts have held that, though the words of the statute should be used in the
admonition, a statement will not be excluded if police officers use another version that clearly
explains the privilege against self-incrimination. See KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra
note 58, §8, at 466. The Miranda decision itself allows for “fully effective equivalents” of the
admonitions laid out by the Court. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
86. The only way a suspect can ensure the presence of counsel during interrogation is to
refuse to speak at all while in police custody. See Barbara Huber, Criminal Procedure in
Germany, in JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 121 (1996). The
Miranda court also did not obligate police interrogators to provide lawyers for suspects while in
custody. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
87. KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, at 615 (§ 20).
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France

Until recently, suspects in French criminal cases had arguably the least
protection in the face of police interrogation in Western Europe. Not only
were suspects not advised that they had a right to remain silent, but they were
only advised after the expiration of twenty-four hours in garde à vue that they
could speak to a lawyer.88 Pursuant to a law passed on June 15, 2000,
“reinforcing the protection of the presumption of innocence and the rights of
the victim,” the provisions regulating police interrogation in garde à vue now
read:
Every person placed in watched custody (garde à vue) shall be
immediately informed by an officer of the judicial police or, under his control,
by an agent of the judicial police, of the nature of the offense as to which the
investigation is being conducted, of the rights mentioned in Articles 63-2, 63-3
and 63-4 as well as the provisions relating to the length of garde à vue
provided in Art. 63. The person in garde à vue shall also be immediately
informed that she has the right not to respond to questions which are asked by
the interrogators.”89
From the beginning of watched custody, up until the expiration of twenty
hours, the person may request to speak with a lawyer. If she is not able to
designate one, or if the lawyer she has chosen cannot be contacted, she can
demand that one be appointed by the Bar.
The Bar is notified of this demand by every possible means and without
delay.
The designated lawyer may communicate with the person in garde à vue
under conditions which guarantee the confidentiality of the meeting. He is
informed by the officer of the judicial police or, under his control, by an agent
of the judicial police, of the nature and the presumed date of the offense as to
which the investigation is being conducted.
At the conclusion of the meeting, which may not exceed thirty minutes, the
lawyer may in appropriate cases submit written observations which are made a
part of the record. The lawyer may not make this meeting known to anyone
for the duration of watched custody.90

Although the 2000 amendments have improved the position of the suspect
who is subject to police interrogation by providing for admonitions of the right
to refuse to answer questions and by allowing access to a lawyer before the
interrogation begins, the regime is still less protective than those in place in
88. See former C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE §§ 63-1, 63-4.
89. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 63-1, as amended by Law No. 2000-516 of June 5, 2000,
discussed supra note 74.
90. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 63-4, as amended by Law No. 2000-516 of June 5, 2000,
discussed supra note 74.
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Italy, Spain and Germany. The suspect still does not have the right to have her
lawyer present during the interrogation.91 Furthermore, the French Code of
Criminal Procedure does not provide for an absolute right to remain silent.
Rather, it provides a privilege not to answer specific questions, much like the
privilege enjoyed by witnesses testifying at another’s trial or before a grand
jury in the United States.
Though French accuseds have had a right to counsel during interrogations
by the investigating magistrate since 1897,92 counsel, after having consulted
with the accused, remains silent during the interrogation.93 From 1993 through
2000, however, the investigating magistrate was under no obligation to advise
an accused of the right to remain silent before conducting the interrogation.94
5.

England and Wales

In England and Wales, the law provides for a system of “duty solicitors,”
lawyers who are present in the jailhouse and are able to confer with arrested
prisoners at any time.95 Arrestees should be immediately informed pursuant to
section 58(1) of the Code of Practice C. Police and Criminal Evidence Act
(PACE) which provides: “A person who is in police detention shall be entitled,
if he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time.” Before 1995, an
arrested suspect had to be cautioned that he did not have to say anything unless
he wished to, but that anything he said could be used as evidence against him.
This changed with the passage of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of
1994 (CJPOA) which introduced the following modified admonitions or
“cautions”:
A person whom there are grounds to suspect of an offence
before any questions about it (or further questions if it
previous questions that provide grounds for suspicion) are
purpose of obtaining evidence which may be given
prosecution.96

must be cautioned
is his answers to
put to him for the
to a court in a

...
The caution shall be in the following terms: “You do not have to say anything.
But it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned,
something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given

91. See PRADEL, supra note 53, at 397
92. Id. at 537.
93. LA MISE EN ÉTAT DES AFFAIRES PÉNALES, supra note 54, at 56.
94. Vogler, supra note 64, at 32.
95. See Richard Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, in JOHN HATCHARD
ET AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193 (1996) [hereinafter Hatchard, Criminal
Procedure in England and Wales].
96. PACE-England § 10.1.
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in evidence. Minor deviations do not constitute a breach of this requirement
provided that the sense of the caution is preserved.97

The CJPOA reauthorized the prosecutor, jury or judge to use an arrested
person’s silence at trial, overturning an 1898 law which prevented such use.98
While the regime of duty solicitors does effectively allow jailed suspects to
talk to a lawyer before police questioning,99 unlike in the United States where
the police are under no obligations to facilitate such a meeting,100 the
admonitions as to possible use or comment on the exercise of the right to
silence certainly provides less protection than the Miranda warnings in the
United States.101
6.

Russia

Although neither the Russian Constitution, nor the Russian Code of
Criminal Procedure, Ugolovno-Protsessual’nyi Kodeks RF, is explicit about
whether the police must admonish suspects as to their constitutional rights to
counsel and to remain silent prior to police interrogation,102 the practice of
doing so was developed by trial courts after the re-introduction of trial by jury
in nine Russian regions in 1993 and 1994.103 In a 1996 advisory ruling, the
Russian Supreme Court approved the practice.104
7.

Other Countries

In the Netherlands, the police may hold a suspect for six hours for the
purpose of interrogation, and this period may be extended for up to seventytwo hours with the consent of the prosecutor. The Dutch do, however, strictly
require that suspects be admonished of the right to remain silent.105 The
Supreme Court of Canada has also held that a defendant must be advised of the
right to counsel and the right to remain silent, since “the most important
function of legal advice upon detention is to ensure that the accused
97. PACE-England § 10.4.
98. The Criminal Evidence Act 1898, discussed in Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in
England and Wales, supra note 95, at 190.
99. See RCCJ REPT., supra note 60, §§ 57, 59, at 37-38 (discussing criticism of duty
solicitors who are perceived as being too closely tied to the police agencies).
100. Police may even deceive lawyers to prevent them from trying to see in-custody suspects.
See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
101. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (commenting on a suspect’s invocation of
his or her Miranda rights constitutes a violation of due process).
102. See discussion of the provisions of the Russian Constitution, supra note 68.
103. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 61, 91-92 (1995) [hereinafter Thaman, Resurrection].
104. Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems, supra note 13, at 242 n.47.
105. Stewart Field et al., Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control of Police
Investigations, in PHIL FENNELL ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
232 n.26 (1995) [hereinafter Field].
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understands his rights, chief among which is his right to silence.”106 Finally,
the German Supreme Court noted, in a survey of comparative law undertaken
in 1992, that admonitions as to the privilege against self-incrimination must
also be given in Denmark.107
C. Timing of the Warnings
Whereas the Miranda warnings only apply once a suspect has been “taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way,”108 several European countries require warnings relating to the right to
remain silent as soon as the criminal investigation focuses on a person as a
possible suspect.109 In a 1992 case, the German Supreme Court explicitly held
that admonitions as to the right to remain silent apply to an out-of-custody
suspect who is confronted by the police on the streets and suspected of having
crashed his automobile while under the influence of alcohol.110 While
acknowledging the “special importance” of the Miranda decision, the court
noted the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Berkemer v. McCarty,111 which
held that Miranda warnings do not apply to out-of-custody automobile stops
even when the person is under temporary detention. The German Supreme
Court declined to follow Berkemer, however, emphasizing the broader
applicability of the German admonitions.112 In Italy as well, the suspectaccused, whether in or out of custody, has the same rights,113 including the
right not to be interrogated by police in the absence of counsel and without
having been advised of the right to remain silent.114
In England and Wales, the “cautions,” though admittedly promising less
protection than the Miranda warnings, apply to out-of-custody suspects.115

106. R. v. Herbert 77 C.R.3d 145, discussed in CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 114 (1993) [hereinafter BRADLEY].
107. BGHSt 38, 215 (229-30).
108. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
109. A “focus” test was applied in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), in
deciding when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would apply in the context of police
investigation. The test still, however, required that the person under focus be in police custody.
110. BGHSt 38, 215 (218).
111. 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
112. BGHSt 38, 215 (230). For an opinion that the restriction of warnings to custodial
situations is not in conformity with notions of procedural fairness as accepted in international
law, see Wilfried Bottke, ‘Rule of Law’ or ‘Due Process’ as a Common Feature of Criminal
Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 447-48 (1990).
113. C.P.P.-ITALY § 61.
114. See Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 345, 360 (1994).
115. R. v. Nelson and Rose, Crim.L.R. 814, 815 (C.A. 1998). The Court held that warnings
had to be given to the defendant, who was carrying a briefcase customs officials suspected
contained false compartments, before he was questioned about the briefcase.
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English courts have even held that undercover police officers or informants
may not do pointed questioning of suspects in the field without giving the
“cautions.”
In our view, although the Code [Code C] extends beyond the treatment of
those in detention, what is clear is that it was intended to protect suspects who
are vulnerable to abuse or pressure from police officers or who may believe
themselves to be so. Frequently, the suspect will be a detainee. But the Code
will also apply where a suspect, not in detention, is being questioned about an
offence by a police officer acting as a police officer for the purpose of
obtaining evidence. In that situation, the officer and the suspect are not on
equal terms. The officer is perceived to be in a position of authority; the
suspect may be intimidated or undermined.116

In R v. Christou & Wright,117 a case involving a police sting operation to
nab dealers in stolen property, the Court held that warnings would not have
been required. A subsequent case, however, cited the language favorably in
holding that it did apply to a police undercover officer who was negotiating to
purchase a stolen car from the defendant, and proceeded to interrogate the
defendant as to when he had stolen the car.118
From the terms of Section 520(2) of the Spanish Code of Criminal
Procedure, it appears that the statutory admonitions apply only when someone
has been detained or otherwise placed in custody. In the United States, a
person must be in custody and subject to interrogation for the Miranda rights
to be obligatory.119
Continental European codes of criminal procedure distinguish
meticulously between procedures for police or judicial interviews of witnesses
and those that apply to suspects or accuseds. Police and other investigators
admonish witnesses routinely that they are obliged to give a statement under
penalty of perjury,120 whereas the privilege against self-incrimination prevents
compelling a suspect to speak in such a manner.
If a police officer, who actually has grounds to suspect a person of having
committed a crime, obliges him to give a statement “as a witness,” all

116. R. v. Christou & Wright, 3 W.L.R. 228 (1992).
117. 3 W.L.R. 228 (1992).
118. R. v. Bryce, 4 All E.R. 567, 571-73 (1992). The Court suppressed the defendant’s
answers due to the lack of cautions.
119. Conversations between police officers that are not “reasonably likely to induce an
incriminating response” do not constitute “interrogation.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
302 (1980); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (booking questions).
120. On the obligation of witnesses to testify in Italy, see C.P.P.-ITALY § 198. With regard to
the same obligation in France, see C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE §§ 105, 109; and PRADEL, supra note 53,
at 348. On the swearing of witnesses under penalty of perjury in Germany, see StPO-GERMANY
§ 57. On the obligation to testify under oath in Spain, see L.E.CRIM.-SPAIN §§ 410, 434.
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European jurisdictions will suppress such a statement.121 In Spain, the
Constitutional Court has held that an investigating magistrate may not question
“as a witness” an out-of-custody person “as to whom can be attributed, more or
less well-founded, a punishable act.” In such cases, he must be permitted “to
exercise the right to defense with the broadest content.” Commenting on the
“old inquisitory procedure,” the Spanish Constitutional Court stated:
The investigating magistrate questioned without communicating what he was
looking for and could interrogate a suspect without letting him know what and
why he was suspected, without making self-defense possible and without
providing him with the assistance of a lawyer in a way that the interrogation
could induce the declarant to make assertions prejudicial to him, including
involuntary self-incrimination which could have been avoided in another type
of interrogation. The Constitution of 1978 and the reform of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of the same year are not compatible with these vestiges of
the old inquisitorial procedure.122

The Russian Constitutional Court has also recently condemned a practice
whereby Russian police arrest suspects as “witnesses” and then question them
without warnings or the assistance of counsel.123 The Court declared Section
47, paragraph 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be unconstitutional
because it restricted the right to counsel to those who had been charged, or to
detained persons as to whom an order of preventive detention had been
issued.124
According to the German Supreme Court, the admonitions of Section 136
of the Code of Criminal Procedure125 must be given “when the suspicion
already present at the beginning of the interrogation has so thickened, that the
interrogated person can seriously be considered as a perpetrator of the
German jurisprudence distinguishes between
investigated crime.”126
“interrogations” and “informational questioning.” If police are only inquiring
to determine if there is sufficient evidence that a crime was committed and are
questioning people at the scene to determine whether they were witnesses or
perpetrators, no warnings are necessary. Otherwise, the solemnity of the

121. See 1989 Bull. Crim. No. 258 (discussing France’s practice in this regard); see also
PRADEL, supra note 53, at 536.
122. S.T.C., July 19, 1989 (B.J.C., No.135, 1130, 1135-36).
123. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Art. No. 2882 (Constitutional Court of the RF June
27, 2000), available at http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/p11_00.html. For a critique of this practice in the
first cases tried in the modern Russian jury courts, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 103, at
91.
124. Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2000, No. 27, Art. No. 2882 (Constitutional Court of the RF June
27, 2000), available at http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/p11_00.html.
125. See text accompanying supra note 85.
126. BGH StV 8, 337 (338).
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warnings would risk treating completely innocent people as suspects and deter
them from cooperating with the police in the future.127
Police in England and the Netherlands get around giving the Miranda-type
warnings by engaging in “informal chats” in suspects’ homes just after arrest,
during searches, in the police car on the way to the station, or in interview
rooms just before formal interrogations are to begin.128 The Dutch Supreme
Court has also ruled that such “chats” as well as “unsolicited outbursts” before
a suspect is admonished need not be suppressed.129 German police also used to
engage in such pre-admonition “chats” until the Supreme Court articulated a
categorical exclusionary rule in such cases.130
Only the Italians appear to have erected a barrier against police using the
pretext of “informational interviews,” “chats,” or interviewing the defendant
“as a witness” to circumvent the necessity of advising a suspect of the right to
counsel and the right to remain silent. Section 350(7) of the Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure makes even spontaneous statements to the police in the
absence of counsel inadmissible in court.131
D. Effect of an Invocation of the Right to Counsel or Silence
The restrictions placed on the police by the U.S. Supreme Court when the
defendant invokes either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel
appear to be more substantial than in many Continental European jurisdictions.
Although police in the United States must desist from questioning a suspect
who indicates a desire to remain silent following Miranda warnings, the
officers may return if a sufficient period of time has passed and, especially, if
they wish to interrogate about another crime.132 On the other hand, in England
and Wales, the police may still put questions to the suspect, who need not
answer them.133

127. See RAIMUND BAUMANN & HARALD BRENNER, DIE STRAFPROZESSUALEN
BEWEISVERWERTUNGSVERBOTE 79 (1991). Spontaneous admissions following the asking of
mere “informational questions” will not be excluded.
See CLAUS ROXIN,
STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 179 (24th ed. 1995). The German Supreme Court ruled some years
ago that it was not “interrogation” to show the defendant’s prior statements made by him to the
police and to the public prosecutor and to ask him if they were true. BGHSt 7, 73, cited in
KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, §15, at 467.
128. Field, supra note 105, at 232.
129. Id.
130. See Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032,
1052 (1983). Studies in the 1980s found that German police officers rather routinely ignored the
warnings requirement. Id. at 1053 n.111.
131. See text accompanying supra note 76.
132. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975).
133. See RCCJ REPT., supra note 60, § 21, at 13.
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In the United States, under the rule of Edwards v. Arizona,134 an invocation
by a suspect of the right to counsel will generally foreclose any further
attempts at interrogation unless the suspect, herself, “initiates” further
conversation.135 As to police attempts to interrogate a suspect after he has
invoked the right to counsel in Germany, the German Supreme Court has said:
If the police officer wants in such a case to continue the interrogation it is only
permissible without a preliminary consultation with defense counsel if the
accused expressly declares himself in agreement with the continuation of the
interrogation after being re-admonished. There must, however, have been a
previous earnest effort by the police officer to help the accused in an effective
manner to realize the contact with a defense lawyer. All this is required,
because the accused is often, especially in the case of an arrest, confused by
the events and pressured and anxious by the unfamiliar surroundings.
...
There was a lack of the required efforts here. Of course the police will, as a
rule, avoid recommending a particular defense lawyer in order to avoid the
impression of a close working relationship with particular defense lawyers. It
is impermissible to pretend readiness to help in setting up the contact with
mere “pretend-activity” and to exploit the expected futility at the outset as well
as the related discouragement of the accused in order to continue the attempt at
interrogation. The mere handing over of the local Hamburg telephone book in
which, under the caption “law offices,” a very great number of entries could be
found, was no help, and, especially in light of the circumstances was better
suited to convince the accused G., who did not understand the German
language, of the impossibility of an impending contact with a lawyer. The
police officers refrained from advising him of the telephone number of the
emergency lawyer service, which could have been of real help.136

E.

Excludability of Statements Made Without Proper Warning
1.

The Theory of “Nullities”

Post-inquisitorial European systems confronted procedural errors, even if
they would today impact constitutional rights, as procedural “nullities,” that is,
void of any legal force. In France “a nullity occurs when there is a failure to
recognize a substantial formality required in a provision of the present code or
any other provision of criminal procedure has infringed on the interests of the

134. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). See also supra note 48.
135. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983).
136. BGHSt, 42, 15 (19-20). See also BGHSt 38, 372 (373), a case in which police denied
the accused the opportunity to contact defense counsel, despite the fact that he already knew who
the defense counsel was. The right of police to attempt to re-question the accused is universally
accepted once he has had a chance to talk to a lawyer. See BGHSt 42, 170 (173-74).
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party to which it applies.”137 Such a violation must, however, “affect the
interests of the party concerned,”138 and not be a “mere” formality. The result
of the finding of a “nullity” would be removal of the documentation of the
tainted evidence from the investigative dossier which was historically the
receptacle for all evidence admissible at trial.139 The French Code of Penal
Procedure does not explicitly provide that violations of the protections related
to garde à vue result in a “nullity” and it is extremely difficult for French
defendants to show that violations in the giving of admonitions prior to
questioning in garde à vue should lead to exclusion of the statements.140
For instance, the French Supreme Court, Cour de cassation, held that a
failure of the police to have the accused sign the document attesting to his
having been advised of his rights prior to questioning in garde à vue did not
affect the accused’s rights.141 Because the accused had indeed been informed
of his rights, the statement would not be excluded.142 On the other hand, the
same court recently held that a failure to advise the suspect of his rights before
garde à vue because of the lack of an interpreter, affected his rights and led to
the suppression of the confession he had made.143
The Italian Code of Penal Procedure differentiates between “absolute
nullities,” something akin to what U.S. courts would call “plain error,” and
“relative nullities.”
“Absolute nullities” include jurisdictional errors,
violations of the prosecutor’s monopoly on the charging power, or violations
of the mandatory right to counsel. “Relative nullities” deal with other
procedural rules during the preliminary investigation or the preliminary
hearing.144 “Absolute nullities” may not be “sanitized” through a proper
correction of the erroneous procedures as may some of the other procedural
violations.145

137. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 171; see also C.P.P.-Italy § 177 (containing similar language).
138. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 802.
139. C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE § 174 para. 3. In the Netherlands, even a coerced statement is not
removed from the investigative file by the investigating magistrate. The decision as to whether it
may be used at trial rests with the trial judge. See Field, supra note 105, at 242.
140. PRADEL, supra note 53, at 398.
141. The decision was made pursuant to Sections 63-1, 64 & 66 of the old version of the
French Code of Criminal Procedure, before the 2000 revisions which introduced a form of
Miranda-warnings. See text accompanying supra note 90.
142. Crim. Dec. 6, 1995, No. 369, at 1082, 1083.
143. Crim. Dec. 3, 1996, No. 443, at 1297, 1298.
144. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 178-181.
145. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 179, 183, 184. See Elizabeth M.T. Di Palma, Riflessioni sulla sfera di
operatività della sanzione di cui all’art. 191 c.p.p., in PERCORSI DI PROCEDURA PENALE, DAL
GARANTISMO INQUISITORIO A UN ACCUSATORIO NON GARANTITO 113, 116-17 (Vincenzo
Perchinunno ed., 1996).
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Non-Usability of Evidence

The modern trend in the post-inquisitorial European systems is to depart
from the old concept of “nullities,” however, in favor of statutory or even
constitutionally based exclusionary rules, preventing the use of evidence
gathered in violation of the law as a foundation for a judgment or
conviction.146 The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure has introduced what
appears to be an ironclad exclusionary rule, phrased in terms of “nonusability,” inutilizzabilità: “Evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions
established by law may not be used.”147 Similarly, in Spain, “evidence
obtained, directly or indirectly, in violation of fundamental rights or liberties
shall be given no effect.”148
It will be recalled that Italy applies a more specific rule of non-usability to
all statements, whether spontaneous or elicited, which are gathered by the
police from a suspect or accused in the absence of defense counsel.149 Despite
the seemingly rigid exclusionary rule relating to statements of suspects and the
accused, there seems to be authority in Italy that the failure to advise the
person subject to police interrogation of the right to remain silent will not lead
to the statement being excluded and a conviction based thereon being
overturned.150 Thus, it appears that the high courts of Italy treat lack of
counsel during interrogations as a fundamental violation leading to “nonusability.” However, the courts treat failure to advise of the right to remain
silent as a mere “nullity,” or error in the statutorily prescribed form of
gathering evidence, which will not necessarily lead to exclusion.151
146. For instance, § 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
“[W]here . . . a court finds that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any of
the rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” See BRADLEY, supra note 106, at 113.
Note that this sounds like the U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier rooting of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule in preserving “judicial integrity.” See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960). The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected this rationale in favor of that based in the
deterrent effect on police of a suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984).
147. C.P.P.-ITALY § 191(1). “Non-usability” is the sanction resulting from a substantive
violation which affects the gathering of a piece of evidence, whereas “nullity” is the sanction
when there is an error in the statutorily prescribed form of acquiring evidence. See SERGIO
RAMAJOLI, LA PROVA NEL PROCESSO PENALE 20-24 (1995) [hereinafter RAMAJOLI].
148. LEY ORGANICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] § 11.1 [hereinafter L.O.P.J.-SPAIN],
translated by author from MUERZA ESPARZA, supra note 56, at 304.
149. C.P.P.-ITALY §§ 63, 350(6)-(7); see text accompanying supra note 76.
150. See Marilena Colamussi, Interrogatorio dell’imputato ed omesso avvertimento della
facoltà di non respondere, in PERCORSI DI PROCEDURA PENALE, DAL GARANTISMO
INQUISITORIO A UN ACCUSATORIO NON GARANTITO 15 (Vincenzo Perchinunno ed., 1996) (citing
a decision of the Italian Supreme Court rendered November 12, 1991).
151. Id. at 16 (criticizing this jurisprudence).
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To trigger Spain’s statutory exclusionary rule, there must be a violation of
a “fundamental right or liberty,” and not violations of mere technical statutory
formalities in the taking of evidence.152 The jurisprudence of the Spanish high
courts has repeatedly made it clear that a failure to advise a suspect-accused of
the right to remain silent or the right to counsel constitute violations of the
constitutional rights incorporated in Articles 17(3) and 24(1) of the Spanish
Constitution and that this, of necessity, requires suppression of the evidence
under Section 11.1 of the Law of the Judicial Power.153 In the words of the
Spanish Supreme Court:
The caselaw is repeated and settled in the sense that, given the Constitution
and the presumption of innocence established in Article 24 as a fundamental
right, the declaration of an accused before the police without the guarantees
established in Article 17 of the Constitution, among which is fundamentally
the presence of a lawyer, cannot be considered to constitute a sufficient basis
for rebutting such presumption.154

The Spanish Constitutional Court has also ruled that admission of evidence
seized in violation of fundamental rights and liberties violates the equality of
the parties in the adversarial trial:
[G]iven the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of fundamental
rights, its procedural reception implies an ignorance of the proper ‘guarantees’
of the trial [Constitución art. 24.2], implying also an unacceptable institutional
confirmation of the lack of equality between the parties at the trial
[Constitución art. 14], a lack of equality which has been procured illegally
benefiting he who has gathered evidentiary instruments in violation of the
fundamental rights of the other.155

Russia also has an exclusionary rule rooted in its Constitution.156 The
constitutional provision was statutorily implemented in the bill that
reestablished trial by jury in 1993.157 It has been applied to exclude statements
152. The Spanish distinguish, similarly, between “illicit evidence” (prueba ilícita) gathered in
violation of a simple law and “prohibited evidence” (prueba prohibida) gathered in violation of
constitutional rights. VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA ET AL., supra note 67, at 384. Note the
similarity here with U.S. jurisprudence, which normally provides for exclusion only when
“constitutional” and not mere statutory rights are violated. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note
23, at 456-59.
153. S.T.S., Feb. 7, 1992 (R.J., No. 1108, 1409-10).
154. S.T.S., Feb. 11, 1998 (R.J., No. 175, 1865, 1867).
155. See B.J.C., March 26, 1996, (B.J.C., No. 49, 133, 137-38, 180).
156. Article 50(2) of the Russian Constitution provides: “In the administration of justice the
use of evidence obtained in violation of federal law shall not be permitted.”
157. Section 69, paragraph 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Evidence
obtained in violation of the law is recognized as not possessing legal force and may not be made a
basis for an accusation nor be used to prove circumstances listed in article 68 of this code”
[relating to proving the elements of the crime]. See also Stephen C. Thaman, Das neue russische
Geschworenengericht, 108 ZSTW 191, 196 n.31, 199 (1996).
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of suspects and the accused in the absence of the admonitions required
pursuant to Article 51 of the Russian Constitution. Evidence has been
suppressed by Russian judges in anywhere from one-third to seventy percent of
all cases tried before Russian juries since 1993,158 including cases of violations
of Russia’s Miranda-type warnings.159 Nevertheless, the Russian Supreme
Court has reversed acquittals of defendants in cases where their inculpatory
statements had been suppressed on the grounds that the trial judge had
purportedly violated the rights of the prosecution by unlawfully excluding the
evidence.160
The Russian Supreme Court has also reversed acquittals of defendants in
cases where confessions were suppressed because they had been taken in
violation of the requirement of admonitions, or following police coercion.
These reversals were based on the fact that the defendant or defense counsel
had told the jury that illegal police tactics had been used. The Supreme Court
held that this constituted bringing irrelevant material, unrelated to proving the
elements of the crime, before the jury.161
3.

The Proportionality Test of Exclusion

The Spanish Supreme Court has ruled that when a violation does not affect
fundamental rights, then the principle of material truth162 prevails and the
evidence will be admitted.163 The German Supreme Court has engaged in
balancing when considering Miranda-type warnings:
The Chamber shares the interpretation of the submitting appellate court that
the violation by a police officer of the duty to admonish pursuant to Sections
136(1)(2) and 163a(4)(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure provides
the basis for a prohibition in the use of the evidence upon which the appeal
filed on behalf of the defendant can fundamentally rely. . . . The Senate
deviates thereby from its earlier jurisprudence . . . .
The German Criminal Procedure Statute gives no conclusive rule about
prohibitions on the use of evidence . . . . The question as to whether a

158. See Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems, supra note 13, at 242 n.47.
159. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 103, at 91.
160. Id.
161. See Thaman, Europe’s New Jury Systems, supra note 13, at 284 n.82.
162. The traditional goal of inquisitorial criminal procedure was to ascertain the truth and this
principle remains at the heart of Continental European criminal procedure. See Albin Eser,
Funktionswandel von Prozeßmaximen, 104 ZStW 361, 362 (1992). See also C. PR. PÉN.-FRANCE
§ 81(1).
163. With regard to the application of the U.S. constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has held: “Unbending
application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.” United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
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prohibition on the gathering of evidence brings with it a prohibition on the use
of the evidence must be specially decided as to each provision and for each
case on its facts. . . . The decision as to whether or not there will be a
prohibition on use is made on the bases of a comprehensive balancing test . . . .
The weight of the procedural violation as well as its importance for the legally
protected sphere of the interested party must be considered and placed in the
balance as well as the consideration, that the truth may not be sought at any
price . . . . On the other hand, one must consider that prohibitions on use
impinge on the possibilities of determining the truth . . . and that the State
according to the case law of the Constitutional Court must guarantee an
administration of justice which is capable of functioning, without which justice
cannot be realized . . . . If the procedural provision, which has been violated,
does not, or not primarily, serve to protect the accused, then a prohibition on
use will be unlikely . . . . On the other hand, a prohibition on use is appropriate
when the violated procedural provision is designed to secure the foundations of
the procedural position of the accused or defendant in a criminal prosecution.
The principle, that no one must testify against himself in a criminal
proceeding, that is, has a right to silence, belongs to the recognized principles
of criminal procedure . . . . It has found a positive expression in Article 14(3g)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United
Nations. The recognition of this right to silence reflects the care given to
human dignity . . . . It protects the personality rights of the accused and is a
necessary component of a fair trial . . . .
At the time of the first interrogation by the police the accused is, compared
with the circumstances at the trial, not to a lesser extent, but rather to a greater
extent in danger of unthinkingly incriminating himself . . . . While the
defendant can calmly prepare himself for his testimonial decisions in the trial
and seek legal counsel, and moreover often has a defense counsel at his side,
the first police interrogation usually finds the accused unprepared, without
anyone to counsel him, and also cut off from familiar surroundings, also not
seldom confused by the events and pressured or afraid due to the
unaccustomed surroundings. The defendant can, also with the help of his
defense counsel, smooth out statements given at the trial, while the first
statements to the police are often deprived of such a possibility of influence
and despite a change in testimonial behavior develop a factual impact which
has significant importance for the further course of the trial.
Whoever, at the beginning of the interrogation knew, even without
admonitions, that he did not have to give a statement, is, however, not worthy
of protection to the same extent as the person who was unaware of his right to
silence. To be sure he must be admonished pursuant to Sections 136(1)(2) and
163a(4)(2) of the German Criminal Procedure Statute.
However the
prohibition on use will exceptionally not apply here. The balancing of the
values leads to the result, that the interest on proceeding with the trial in such a
case should be accorded priority. If the trial judge, preferably through free
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evaluation of the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the accused knew his
right to silence at the beginning of the interrogation, then he may use the
content of the statements which the accused made to the police without the
admonitions, in formulating the judgment. Otherwise he must heed the
prohibition on use.164

Determining that a violation is substantial and impacts constitutional rights
will always lead to exclusion in Spain, whereas it is only the first step in the
German analysis. In Germany, while the failure to admonish is a violation of a
substantial right of the suspect, it will not lead to exclusion and is deemed
harmless, if there is evidence that the defendant already knew of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to speak with counsel.165 German
courts will also balance the seriousness of the offense into the equation and
will allow use of evidence seized in violation of basic rights if the seriousness
of the offense investigated significantly outweighs the seriousness of the
violation.166
4.

Case-by-Case Fairness Test: The English Approach

There is no blanket statutory exclusionary rule in England and Wales. As
in Germany, the decision whether or not to exclude is approached on a caseby-case basis pursuant to Section 78(1) of the PACE, which provides:
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposed to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an

164. BGHSt 38, 214 (219-22, 224-25, 227-30).
165. Miranda warnings must, on the other hand, be given to all in-custody suspects before
being interrogated: “The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of
constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the
privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was
aware of his rights without a warning being given.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
166. The German Supreme Court has recognized that the seizure and reading of private
diaries violates the right to human dignity guaranteed by Article 1 of the German Constitution
and the right to a “free development of the personality” guaranteed by Article 22. It has
suppressed inculpatory evidence gleaned from such a seizure in a prosecution for perjury. BGHSt
19, 325 (330-33). On the other hand, the Court refused to suppress diary entries in a brutal
murder case. BGHSt 34, 397 (401).
The U.S. Supreme Court also makes some distinctions based on the seriousness of the
offense. For instance, a warrantless entry of a dwelling on probable cause that evidence will be
destroyed is impermissible if the offense is a minor one. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
750 (1984). Similarly, an arrest in public for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the
arresting officer will normally not be permitted without an arrest warrant, whereas a felony arrest
without a warrant under such circumstances is permissible. See United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411, 418 (1976).
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adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it . . . .167

In cases where statements from suspects have been taken in the absence of the
required warnings or in violation of the right to counsel, and where no other
“oppression” is present,168 the trial court must decide whether the use of the
statements will result in an “unfair” trial. In a case where the accused was
interviewed four times without access to counsel in violation of Section 58 of
the PACE, the trial court admitted the statements, and the defendant was
convicted.169 The English Court of Appeal ruled that: “In this case this
appellant was denied improperly one of the most important and fundamental
rights of a citizen” and reversed the conviction. It held that the court had not
properly balanced the seriousness of the violation against any possible reasons
for the violation.170 In effecting this case-by-case balancing, English courts,
like their German counterparts, take into consideration whether the failure to
admonish was in bad faith and whether the suspect already knew of the right to
remain silent.171
English courts will also suppress statements per Section 78 of the PACE
when the suspect is deluded about the precise nature of the charges confronting
him at the time he is interrogated. In one case a man was led to believe that he
was only being interrogated about a purse-snatch robbery and was not told that
the victim, an old woman, had fallen, hurt herself badly, and died in the
hospital. The Court of Appeal ruled that this constituted a violation of such
seriousness that exclusion was the proper remedy.172 While the statutes
regulating the Miranda-like admonitions in Germany, Spain, France and Italy
all require that the suspect be advised of the nature of the crime attributed to
her, Germany, for instance, allows the police to withhold the exact nature of
the offense if its revelation will hinder the police in resolving the case.173

167. PACE-ENGLAND § 78 displaces the old case law in England, which did not provide for
suppression of illegally gathered evidence other than in cases of involuntary confessions. See
SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra note 58, at 139.
168. Involuntary statements that are the result of “oppression” are excludable pursuant to
PACE-ENGLAND § 76.
169. R. v. Samuel, 2 All E.R. 135, 147 (C.A. 1988).
170. Id. at 147.
171. See R. v. Alladice, 87 Crim. App. R. 380 (1988), cited in SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra
note 58, at 130-31.
172. R. v. Kirk, 1 W.L.R. 567 (C.A. 2000).
173. See KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, at 467 § 13. Presumably this
would exclude as a means of resolving the case an inducement of a confession through deception.
But the German Supreme Court upheld a conviction in a case where the police told the defendant,
who at the time was being interrogated as a witness, that the supposedly “missing person” they
were investigating had already been found dead. Once they revealed the death, the defendant was
then properly admonished before giving an incriminating statement. BGHSt 8, 337 (338-39).
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Other Countries

Canada seems to have implemented a fairly rigid exclusionary rule when
police do not respect a suspect’s request to see counsel before being
interrogated. Where a suspect was nevertheless interrogated after having
stated, “I ain’t saying anything until I see my lawyer,” the Canadian Supreme
Court suppressed the statement and reversed a conviction based thereon,
holding that Section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
imposed a duty on police “to cease questioning or otherwise attempting to
elicit evidence from the detainee until he has had a reasonable opportunity to
retain and instruct counsel.”174
F.

Fruits of the Poisonous Tree

The fact that a statement obtained from a suspect in the absence of
Miranda-like warnings cannot be used against him or her at trial does not
necessarily reach the question of whether the information obtained in such
statement may be used to follow investigative leads. These leads provide, for
instance, a basis upon which to obtain a search warrant or wiretap,175 or to
impeach the defendant if he testifies contrary thereto at trial.176 If the
statement without warnings is followed by proper admonitions, and then a
statement affirming the facts that were revealed in the illegal statement is
made, the second statement will also be admissible.177
The Spanish courts have repeatedly invoked the doctrine of “fruit of the
poisonous tree.”178 In a 1992 decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, the
defendants appealed convictions for being members of an armed terrorist

174. Queen v. Manninen, 58 C.R.3d 97, 104 (1987), cited in BRADLEY, supra note 106, at
116.
175. Evidence found by exploiting leads obtained in a Miranda-defective statement has been
ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court to be beyond the scope of Miranda’s exclusionary rule. See
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (witness discovered). See also New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O’Connor J., concurring); United States v. GonzalezSandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th
Cir. 1997).
176. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21 (1990).
177. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985). Justice O’Connor, in Elstad,
explained why the “fruits” of a Miranda-defective statement would still be admissible: “The
Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be
triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. The Fifth Amendment prohibits
use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony.” Id. at 306-07. Since the
Court has distanced itself from this language in United States v. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000), in holding that Miranda warnings are constitutionally compelled, one must wonder if this
case law is still fully applicable. This was discussed by Professors Israel, Dripps and Nowak at
the Childress Lecture at the Saint Louis University School of Law on September 28, 2000.
178. The term was first coined by Justice Frankfurter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW

611

group and possessing military weapons and explosives on the basis that the
weapons had been found in a garage based on leads gathered in the defendants’
statements which were taken in the absence of counsel.
The illegitimate or illegal acquisition of evidence can function in conformity
with Section 11.1 of the Spanish Law of the Judicial Power by directly or
indirectly violating or undermining a fundamental right. The condition
reflected or indirectly established in the indicated provision cannot but intend
to refer to cases in which the illegality of the acquired evidence is based on
other activity which in a direct manner has violated a fundamental right.
Thus, a doctrinal example is given of the case in which in an interrogation in
which fundamental rights have been violated, one finds, after an act of entry
and search effectuated with a judicial warrant, arms and fruits from a robbery
or narcotic substances. The theme in such cases is that of determining if the
irregularity irradiates its effects to the totality of the evidence by virtue of the
so-called ‘doctrine of the fruits of the poisonous tree’ found in Anglo-Saxon
law [‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine’] or if, on the contrary, there does not
exist a relation of interdependency between the irregular and the regular and
thus the latter can be deemed to be useful to undermine the presumption of
innocence.
The doctrinal solution is reasonable which in such cases distinguishes between
the cases in which one simply gains knowledge of a fact and those in which by
the verification of such a fact [discovery of the objects] one tries to derive an
evidentiary consequence against the accused. [For example, that he/she had
placed the objects and had dominion and control over them]. In this second
case, the evidence would be illegal, whereas in the first, since the content of
the confession had no evidentiary significance, not even in a circumstantial
sense, it could not be deemed to be illegally obtained evidence.179

In Germany, the literature is not clear as to whether a violation of the
admonitions required by Sections 136 and 243(4)(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure will also lead to a prohibition against following leads gathered from
the inadmissible statements.180 Germans do, however, recognize a variation on
the “independent source”181 and “inevitable discovery”182 doctrines which

179. See STS, Feb. 7, 1992 (R.J., No. 1108, p. 1409, 1410). There appears, however, to be
some case law allowing use of “fruits” of a defective confession, as long the “indirect” fruits of
the bad confession do not constitute the only basis for the finding of guilt. See VICENTE GIMENO
SENDRA ET AL., supra note 67, at 507.
180. See KLEINKNECHT & MEYER-GOßNER, supra note 58, § 20, at 469.
181. In U.S. jurisprudence, evidence first discovered unlawfully may nevertheless be
admissible, if there is a legal independent source for its ultimate discovery and seizure. See
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). Justice Holmes first used the term
“independent source” in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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require that the police have “clean hands.”183 It must thereby be shown that
there was a “clean path” to the evidence independent of the illegality or, the
counterpart to “inevitable discovery,” a “hypothetical clean path.”184
European Courts have on occasion suppressed statements following proper
Miranda-like warnings if they followed on the heels of incriminating
statements that had been given either without proper warnings or in violation
of the right to counsel. In a 1991 case in England, a woman was arrested on
homicide charges and was interviewed on two occasions. A solicitor was
present for only one of these meetings. The Court of Appeal expostulated:
On appeal it was held that the first confession was made in consequence of M
being denied access to a solicitor and was for that reason likely to be
unreliable. Had a solicitor been present the interview would have been halted
when M became emotionally upset. The interview was held quickly and
without the formalities of the Code because the police were anxious to
discover the missing woman, but this heightened the risk of the confession
being unreliable.
The second interview took place the following day in compliance with the
provisions of the Code and in the presence of a solicitor. However that
confession was a direct consequence of the first. Moreover the appellant’s
solicitor was not informed that the appellant had been wrongly denied access
when M was brought to the police station. If the solicitor had known that, she
would have realized immediately that the first confession was suspect and in
all probability would not have allowed the second interview to take place.
Held, that the earlier breaches of the Act and the Code rendered the contents of
the second interview inadmissible also. The court added that one cannot
refrain from emphasizing that when an accused person has made a series of
admissions as to his or her complicity in a crime at a first interview, the very
fact that those admissions have been made are likely to have an effect upon the
person during the course of a second interview. Accordingly, if it be held, as it
is held here, that the first interview was in breach of the rules and in breach of
182. In U.S. jurisprudence, evidence unlawfully seized may nevertheless be admissible if it
would inevitably have been discovered by legal means. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984).
183. The German exclusionary rules are not exclusively based on police deterrence as they
are in the United States. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984). Rather, the focus in
Germany is on what the U.S. Supreme Court used to call “judicial integrity.” See discussion of
“judicial integrity” supra note 146; see Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
WORLDWIDE STUDY 197 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) [hereinafter Weigend, Germany].
184. Canada also employs the doctrine of “inevitable discovery.” In R. v. Black, 70 C.R.3d
97, 117 (1989), the defendant requested a particular lawyer and the police attempted
unsuccessfully to contact that lawyer. Police questioned the defendant nevertheless, and she
confessed. Her confession led police to the murder weapon. The Canadian Supreme Court
suppressed the confession but held that the knife would “undoubtedly have been uncovered by the
police in the absence of the Charter breach.” See BRADLEY, supra note 106, at 116.
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Section 58, it seems to the court that the subsequent interview must be
similarly tainted.
Both confessions should have been excluded under Section 76, PACE the
result of that evidence being excluded is that there was no reliable evidence
against M and accordingly the appeal was allowed and the conviction
quashed.185

The sense of urgency that led the police to interview without proper
admonitions in the case discussed above might have excused the giving of
Miranda-like admonitions in the United States under the “public safety
exception” articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court.186 Here, the English Court
of Appeal noted that such admissions might be less reliable than those given in
non-emergency situations. German courts have also found that subsequent
admissions with proper admonitions were not independent from an earlier
illegal statement given after police had hampered the suspect’s attempts to
contact counsel.187 It must be emphasized, however, that the aforementioned
English and German decisions are not necessarily different than would be
required by U.S. law, inasmuch as a refusal to respect a request for counsel
prior to charging188 or after charging189 would also render subsequent
statements inadmissible.
Although statements taken in the absence of counsel may not be used
against the defendant in his own trial in Italy, they may be used to impeach the
defendant and for other non-trial purposes, but only if the defendant had been
advised of the right to counsel.190 There is also authority that such statements
may be used against the defendant in hearings related to the imposition of
preventive detention or other protective measures, or in making a decision
about whether to initiate procedures for an expedited trial.191 Such statements
may also be used against third-party defendants.192
G. Evidentiary Use of the Exercise of the Right to Remain Silent
Finally, there is the issue regarding what happens when a suspect-accused
in Europe actually decides not to give a statement after being admonished of
185. R. v. McGovern, Crim. L.R. 124, 125 (1991).
186. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
187. “However this interrogation was directly related to the previous questioning; it had as its
goal, among other things, to preserve the confession in an evidentiarily admissible form.” See
BGHSt 38, 372 (375).
188. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
189. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977).
190. See Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 264
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999).
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also RAMAJOLI, supra note 147, at 42.
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the right to remain silent. In the United States, no comment may be made at
trial on the defendant’s refusal to testify on his own behalf, and the jury is
admonished that this fact may not be used by them as evidence of guilt.193
Regarding the defendant’s pre-trial silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the prosecution may comment on a suspect’s pre-arrest silence or silence
when confronted with incriminating evidence,194 and on the silence of a
suspect post-arrest, but before being given her Miranda warnings.195 The
Supreme Court has, however, held that it would violate due process to allow
comment or use of a suspect’s or accused’s silence after she had been
admonished pursuant to Miranda of the right to remain silent.196
While the fact of a suspect-accused’s silence during the investigation may
traditionally give rise to an adverse inference in French criminal
proceedings,197 no evidentiary use may be made of such silence following
admonitions in Germany. In a 1965 case the German Supreme Court
confronted a man who remained silent when the police attempted to interrogate
him regarding thefts from telephone booths, but later spoke to the investigating
magistrate. The court opined:
Whether the right of the accused, to refuse to make a statement about the case,
also completely prohibits drawing disadvantageous conclusions from his
silence, may be doubtful. This is especially the case when the accused remains
silent only partially, or during only one or a few of multiple judicial
interrogations. In the instant case the Chamber need not answer this question.
Such conclusions are legally inadmissible in any case when the accused, as
was here the case availed himself of this right to the full extent at arrest and in
the following police interrogation, because he, regardless of for what reason,
deemed it to be correct to first make statements about the case during a judicial
interrogation.
A contrary view would limit the right of the accused, not to make a statement
about the case, in a legally impermissible manner. For it signifies that the
accused, who is aware thereof, would feel himself compelled to give a
statement immediately at his first police interrogation, rather than run the risk
that disadvantageous inferences could be drawn in a later judicial proceeding
from his conduct during that interrogation. An interpretation which would lead
to such results contradicts Section 136a of the German Criminal Procedure
193. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 298
(1981).
194. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1980).
195. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 609 (1982).
196. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976).
197. Vogler, supra note 64, at 32, notes that “the nature of the trial process ensures that it is
almost impossible, in practice, to remain silent,” but that when a defendant does so, as in the trials
of Marshall Pétain in 1945 and General Salan during the Algerian crisis of 1962, “it may give rise
to an adverse inference.”
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Statute, which fundamentally prohibits undermining the accused’s freedom of
exercising his own will through coercion.
Criminal procedure must also be just to accused individuals who are innocent.
Even such individuals can, for reasons of the most varied sort, consider it
proper to make a statement about the case before a judge rather than before a
police officer. The fear that a corresponding attitude could be considered to
his disadvantage during the evaluation of the evidence would make such
conduct in many cases well-nigh impossible and therefore limit the right to
remain silent before the police in a manner which is unacceptable. As to
accused individuals who are guilty, the same applies. He should be treated like
an innocent person up until a judgment of guilt has become final.198

In 1999, the German Supreme Court also held that no inference of guilt may be
drawn, not only from the refusal of a defendant to testify, but also from his
refusal to release his sister from a statutory privilege not to testify against a
close relative.199
At common law, an accused’s failure to give evidence could not be
commented on by the prosecution and could have no independent evidentiary
effect.200 This has changed in the United Kingdom, first with the enactment of
the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of 1988,201 and then, in
England and Wales, with the enactment of the Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act in 1994 (CJPOA), which provides that:
(1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is
given that the accused—
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being
questioned under caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by
whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention any fact relied
on in his defence in those proceedings; or
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might
be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any fact, being a fact which in the
circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been
expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case
may be, subsection (2) below applies.
(2) Where this subsection applies—
(c) the court in determining whether there is a case to answer; and

198. BGHSt 20, 281 (282-83).
199. See StPO-GERMANY § 52(3); BGH StV 5, 234.
200. See SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra note 58, at 73-74, citing Criminal Evidence Act 1898
§ 1(b) and R. v. Martinez-Tobon, 1 W.L.R. 388 (1994).
201. See discussion of the Order in Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. 29, 36 (1996).
This law was enacted to deal with the “troubles” in Northern Ireland. Id.
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(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the
offence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear
proper.202

Other sections in the CJPOA effectively compel a suspect to respond to police
questions when caught in flagrante203 or at the scene of a crime,204 and allow
comment on, and use of, a suspect’s refusal to respond to police questions in
those situations.
Defendants in Northern Ireland, and in England and Wales have
challenged these laws before the European Court of Human Rights. In Murray
v. United Kingdom,205 the defendant was arrested at the scene of an alleged
hostage-taking. Following the advice of his solicitor, he refused to make any
statements at the scene to police officers after having been admonished that his
silence could be used against him at trial. The defendant was convicted in a
trial before a professional judge who used his silence against him.206 The
defendant claimed that the Northern Ireland statute, which was the model for
the CJPOA, violated his right to remain silent and the presumption of
innocence as protected by the English common law.207 The Court discussed
the amicus brief of Amnesty International, which made the following
arguments:
Article 14 (3) (g) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
explicitly provides that an accused shall “not be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt.” Reference was also made to Rule 42(A) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia which expressly provides that a suspect has the right to
remain silent and to the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
submitted to the United Nations General Assembly by the International Law
Commission, which in Draft Article 26 (6)(a)(i) qualifies the right to silence
with the words “without such silence being a consideration in the
determination of guilt or innocence.”208

202. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act [CJPOA] § 34 (1)(2) [hereinafter CJPOAENGLAND], cited in SEABROOKE & SPRACK, supra note 58.
203. This is so where, for instance, the suspect is in possession of evidence that the police link
to the scene of the crime. See CJPOA-ENGLAND § 36.
204. CJPOA-ENGLAND § 37.
205. Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. 29, 36 (1996).
206. Id. at 34. Jury trial was suspended in Northern Ireland for cases involving alleged
terrorism. See Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1 (1995).
207. The European Convention of Human Rights explicitly guarantees the presumption of
innocence under Article 6(2), and the provisions of Article 6(1), which guarantee a right to a fair
trial, have been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights to include a right to remain
silent. Funke v. France, 1 C.M.L.R. 897, 909-10 (1993).
208. Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 E.H.R.R. §42, at 58-59.
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The Court, while finding that the privilege against self-incrimination “lie at the
heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6,”209 refused to prevent
use of silence in all cases:
On the one hand, it is self-evident that it is incompatible with the immunities
under consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the accused’s
silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give evidence himself. On the
other hand, the Court deems it equally obvious that these immunities cannot
and should not prevent that the accused’s silence, in situations which clearly
call for an explanation from him, be taken into account in assessing the
persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.210

The European Court of Human Rights was later called upon to decide a case
arising under Section 34 of the CJPOA, in which the defendants were arrested
for narcotics violations and exercised their right to remain silent upon advice
of their lawyers partially due to the fact that they were under the influence of
drugs at the time.211 The case was tried by a jury, which was instructed under
Section 36 of the CJPOA that it could use the defendants’ silence to prove
guilt. In this case, the Court held that the evidentiary use of the defendants’
silence violated Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, because the jury had not been
instructed, per Murray, that silence could not be the only evidence showing
guilt and that there must be a prima facie showing of guilt for the silence to be
admissible. The Court also held that the defendants’ testimony that counsel
had advised them not to speak made the case distinguishable from Murray.212
Some English courts, as well, have deemed it error for the judge to instruct
the jury that they may draw an inference of guilt from the fact that the
defendant did not mention certain things to the police which he later relied
upon during his testimony at trial.213

209. Id. § 45, at 60.
210. Id. §47, at 60.
211. Condron v. United Kingdom, Crim. L.R. 679 (2000), available at
http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=1111181321&Notice
=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0.
212. Id. at §§57, 60, 61, 66 & 68.
213. For instance, in R. v. McGarry, 1 W.L.R. 1500 (C.A. 1999), the defendant refused to
speak to the police and later gave a short written statement claiming he had assaulted the victim in
self-defense. At trial he provided more details of the alleged assault by the victim, and the judge
instructed the jury that they could use his failure to tell the police of the details as circumstantial
evidence of guilt. The court held that in such a situation the court should have instructed the jury
pursuant to the common law rule that they may not draw any inferences from the defendant’s
silence. Id. at 1505-06.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This perusal of the laws and jurisprudence in major European democratic
jurisdictions as it relates to what we call “Miranda-rights” (for instance, the
requirement of admonishing a suspect or accused in a criminal case of her right
to remain silent and to consult with counsel before being interrogated), has
revealed that the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in United States v.
Dickerson214 to reject a challenge to the constitutionality of the regime
imposed by Miranda. Not only have the Miranda warnings become a
recognized procedure in police interrogations in this country, but, as this article
has explained, they have been adopted or strengthened over the years in
formerly inquisitorial countries like Germany, Italy, Spain and most recently
France, and are now recognized as having constitutional status.215 The postinquisitorial regimes of the European Continent seem to be moving in the
direction of according criminal suspects more protection in their confrontations
with police and other law enforcement officials. Ironically, it is in the United
Kingdom, the main common law jurisdiction in Europe, that there has been a
regression in this area with the enactment of Section 34 of the CJPOA in 1994.
By allowing comment on a suspect’s exercise of his right to remain silent, this
section puts more pressure on the individual to submit to interrogation than any
of the other regimes that have been examined on the European Continent.216
In Italy and Spain a suspect has a right to have counsel present when he is
questioned by the police, the prosecutor or a judge. This is a right not enjoyed
in England, the United States, France or Germany.217 Finally, Italy has taken a
big step in completely eliminating the admissibility of any statements taken by
police officers from suspects and has attempted to transform the
“interrogation” exclusively into a vehicle of self-defense for the suspect.218
Miranda-like warnings must be administered in Italy, Germany and England
whenever suspicion is focused on a suspect, whether or not that person is in
custody, thus giving more protection than Miranda itself in that regard.219
Thus, if America is to entertain ideas about reforming the law of
interrogation, it has two directions in which to move. It can either move
backwards (historically) to a more inquisitorial form of procedure aimed at
making the suspect a prime source for evidence to be used in his own
prosecution. Or, the United States can move away from the inquisitorial

214. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
215. See discussion supra Section III-B.
216. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. An exception is still France, where comment
on the defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent may still be used as an inference of guilt.
See supra note 197.
217. See discussion supra Section III-B.
218. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
219. See discussion supra Section III-C.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

MIRANDA IN COMPARATIVE LAW

619

modes, as is happening on the European Continent, by strengthening the right
to counsel during pretrial confrontations with the police and other law
enforcement personnel and granting the individual autonomy in the decision of
whether to speak in his own defense, or accept guilt and throw himself on the
mercy of the court.
What effect do the varying regimes in place have on whether a suspect
decides to speak in his or her own defense or to admit guilt? In England and
Wales before the enactment of Section 34 of the CJPOA, most suspects spoke
with the police.220 The same is likely true in the United States.221 It is also no
secret that most Continental European defendants speak to their interrogators
before trial and go on to testify at trial, regardless of what regime of
admonitions is in place.222 Whether or not a defendant speaks, however, is
arguably attributable more to procedural realities in a criminal justice system
other than the nature of admonitions, and finally, to a defendant’s view on the
relative benefits he or she may receive from admitting guilt or giving evidence
in his or her own behalf. For instance, Continental European trials are usually
not bifurcated into guilt and penalty phases, as are most American trials.
Therefore, if the court is to hear mitigating evidence it must be before the guilt
question has been decided. This induces most European defendants to speak
both before and during trial.223
In America, the “accused speaks,” as everyone knows, in upwards of
ninety percent of all cases in the form of a guilty plea.224 But we should really
examine whether our system of police-dominated, jailhouse interrogations, in
the absence of counsel continues to be necessary in the administration of
criminal justice in our country. The fact that the police are allowed to question
suspects without counsel being present in the United States, England and
Wales, France and Germany means that police may, after getting a valid

220. In metropolitan police districts, fourteen to sixteen percent remained silent, whereas in
provincial districts the percentage fell to between six and ten percent. In metropolitan districts
twenty-nine percent of those who pleaded not guilty remained silent, whereas seventeen percent
of those who pleaded guilty did so. See RCCJ REPT., supra note 60, at 53.
221. In the United States, there are voices in the literature that claim the imposition of
Miranda warnings has hampered law enforcement ability to get confessions and just as many who
claim it has had little effect. See SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 23, at 652-53.
222. See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure, l2l U. PA. L. REV. 506, 527 (l973).
223. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 128 n.56 (1986).
Some German reformers have proposed bifurcating the guilt and sentencing stages of trials so as
to better guarantee a defendant’s right to remain silent during the trial. See Roxin, supra note 84,
at 197-98. One could say that the “accused speaks” form of trial still exists to a greater extent on
the European Continent than it does today in America. Cf. Langbein, The Privilege, supra note 2,
and accompanying text.
224. See WAYNE R. LA FAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
957 (3d ed. 2000).
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waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent, use many of the same
psychological tactics (short of coercion, and excessive trickery, promises or
threats) that were documented in the Miranda opinion itself.225 All too
frequently one reads newspaper accounts in the United States of innocent
people who confess to serious crimes, even sometimes capital murder, after
succumbing to the pressures or trickery of interrogating police officers,226 after
having waived their Miranda rights. Such cases arise in other countries as
well.227 Despite the new regime of Miranda-like warnings in Russia, Russian
police and investigators are notorious for their use of torture to coerce
confessions by pretrial detainees.228
The Italian solution of eliminating police interrogation as a source of
admissible incriminating evidence is worth considering. The United States
could also adopt the Italian legislative solution of permitting interrogation of
suspects only on their motion and only when they think it will aid in their
defense.229 This would mean sacrificing the interrogation of the suspect or
accused as a means of investigating his or her guilt. In inquisitorial terms, the
ascertainment of the truth would have to rely more heavily on witness
testimony and circumstantial evidence.
Other options would include substituting interrogation by a judge, which
would result in a return to a variant of the justice of the peace system of the
common law, or introducing a variant of the “judge of the investigation” or
“investigating magistrate” systems that exist on the European continent.230 A

225. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 447 (discussing methods from police manuals, etc.). For good
examples of borderline cases involving deception and trickery following waiver of Miranda
rights in which convictions were upheld, see Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 612 (3d Cir. 1986),
and Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 904 (2d Cir. 1988). On the methods “aptly described as
physically intimidating, teetering on the brink of violence” used by police, including swearing,
interrogating late at night, lying about evidence against a suspect and about their ability and
willingness to get a suspect a lower sentence, see Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment First Principles: the Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 873 (1995),
citing DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199-220 (1991) [hereinafter
Amar & Lettow].
226. See Stephen C. Thaman, Is America a Systematic Violator of Human Rights in the
Administration of Criminal Justice? 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 999, 1010 (2000) [hereinafter Thaman,
America].
227. Andreas Ulrich, Wer tötete Johanna Schenuit?, 25 DER SPEIGEL 72 (2000).
228. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH: CONFESSIONS AT ANY COST: POLICE TORTURE IN RUSSIA
21 (2000). The favorite tools of the Russian police: beatings and asphyxiation, were also used by
police in one Chicago precinct to coerce nine confessions in murder cases, some by innocent
people, which led to death sentences. See Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Failure of the
Death Penalty in Illinois: A Tortured Path to Death Row, CHI. TRIB. Nov. 17, 1999, at 1.
229. See text accompanying supra notes 75-80. This could be done by organizing a pre-trial
deposition before a judge, as is allowed in some states for the taking of witness testimony. See
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 25.12, 25.14 (1980).
230. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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number of American commentators have suggested instituting questioning of
criminal suspects by a magistrate and allowing comment on their silence in
case they refuse.231 This would presumably mean adopting modified
admonitions along the lines of England’s CJPOA.232 Some would restrict such
compulsion to speak in cases where the suspect is caught in flagrante or when
there is an adequate and/or convincing prima facie case of guilt.233 Some
voices have gone even further, advocating a return to a purely inquisitorial
system of compelled examination of criminal suspects by magistrates where
the suspect’s silence would not only be used against him at trial, but would
also be punished by contempt.234 Thus, ironically, the old common law
jurisdictions are moving in a more inquisitorial direction and praising the
principle of material truth235 at a time when the post-inquisitorial systems on

231. This would, of course, require overruling Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See
discussion in text accompanying supra note 193. The classic positions are the following: Paul G.
Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused—A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV.
1224 (1932); WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 78 (1967); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 713, n.180, discussed in
Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled
Testimony, 98 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931-32 (1995). See also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN
JUSTICE 98-99 (1980). Professor Dripps has also advocated moving in this direction. See Donald
A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 78 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 730-31 (1988).
232. See discussion in text accompanying supra notes 97-101.
233. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 182, 203. The same kind of probable cause was needed in
Sixteenth Century Germany before one could use torture. See supra note 5 and accompanying
text. This would amount to a kind of reversal of the burden of proof before trial in such a case
and even, one could argue, in the elimination of the presumption of innocence. But see Salabiaku
v. France, 13 E.H.R.R. 379 (1991), and Pham Hoang v. France, 16 E.H.R.R. 53 (1993),
demonstrating that a reversal of the burden of proof has been accepted by the European Court of
Human Rights to some extent.
234. Amar & Lettow, supra note 225, at 898-99. The authors would also subject a lying
suspect to prosecution for perjury and even suggest augmentation of the sanctions for perjury. Id.
at 899 n.191. The catch is that the statement would not be admissible at the suspect’s trial, but
any other evidence found as a result of the coerced confession would be admissible. Id. at 858.
Police interrogation would be discouraged, but Amar and Lettow would still let in “fruits” of their
illegal interrogations for they would have been “inevitably discovered” at the “civilized”
interrogation by the magistrates. Id. at 908 n.227. Lawyers would be excluded from the judicial
interrogations. Id. at 899 n.192. For criticism of Amar and Lettow’s reform proposals and their
theoretical foundations, see Kamisar, supra note 231. In my opinion, a proposal such as that of
Amar and Lettow would be considered to violate human rights in all Western European countries.
In addition, such a proposal would likely violate Article 6 of the European Convention of Human
Rights. See discussions of Murray v. United Kingdom and Condon v. United Kingdom, in text
accompanying supra notes 205-212.
235. Examples of articles pushing the principle of material truth include: Marvin E. Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Thomas L. Steffen,
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the European Continent are calling into question its centrality among their
guiding principles.236
While abolishing police interrogation would certainly put more pressure on
police departments to do more exhaustive and costly criminal investigations, it
would not necessarily result in fewer convictions. There appear to be few
cases among Miranda’s progeny decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in which
the prime reason for police interrogation was to determine who committed the
homicide. More often than not it appears to have been to gather aggravating
evidence which could even trigger a death penalty.237 Confessions in many
cases are not primarily used to ascertain the truth but rather to facilitate the
imposition of more severe punishments. America is widely condemned around
the world not only for its use of the death penalty, but also for its liberal use of
extremely lengthy sentences, including life imprisonment, for non-violent
crimes.238 The threat of these Draconian punishments also serves to enforce
our system of plea-bargaining by inducing defendants to enter a plea of guilty
to minimize their exposure to such punishments.239
Can we reasonably allow suspects and accused individuals to aid in their
own convictions by compelling them to a greater degree to submit to
interrogations, by allowing comment and use of their silence, in a system
Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 1988
UTAH L. REV. 799.
236. While trial judges in France (pursuant to C. PR. PEN-FRANCE § 310) and trial judges in
Germany (pursuant to StPO-GERMANY § 244(2)) are obligated to ascertain the truth at trial, the
role of Spain’s judges (pursuant to L.E.CRIM-SPAIN § 683) and Russia’s juries (pursuant to UPK
RF-RUSSIA § 429 para. 1) is to facilitate an adversarial taking of the evidence conducive to
finding the truth. The Italian legislature’s attempt to transform the trial judge into a passive
arbiter with no obligation to uncover the truth has been undermined by rulings of the Italian
Supreme Court. Supreme Court cases have clearly emphasized that the trial judge still has a duty
to uncover the truth. CASS. PENALE, 10 oct. 1991, n.648, 1258. For a discussion, see HansHeinrich Jescheck, Grundgedanken der neuen italienischen Strafprozeßordnung in
rechtsvergleichender Sicht, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ARTHUR KAUFMANN ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG,
659, 663 (1993). On the “overburdening” of the principle of material truth, see Bernd
Schünemann, Reflexionen über die Zukunft des deutschen Strafverfahrens, in STRAFRECHT,
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT, ANWALTSRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERD PFEIFFER, 461, 475 (1988).
On the move in Europe away from the principle of material truth and its lack of continued
vitality, see Thomas Weigend, Die Reform des Strafverfahrens, Europäische und deutsche
Tendenzen und Probleme in 104 ZSTW 486, 488-96 (1992) [hereinafter Weigend, Reform].
237. Indeed, in Miranda itself, eyewitnesses had already identified Miranda and the defendant
in a consolidated case, Vignera v. New York. In addition, the defendant in California v. Stewart
had been identified cashing checks of the robbery-murder victim and evidence from that crime
and other similar crimes had been found in his apartment following a search. Stewart had been
sentenced to death. 384 U.S. at 456-57.
238. See Thaman, America, supra note 226, at 1000-01, 1021-23. Even in times of
prosperity, such as the present, when crime rates are decreasing, America incarcerates more of its
children per capita perhaps than any other country in the history of the world. Id. at 1015.
239. Id. at 1015-16.
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which subjects them to punishments viewed as cruel and inhumane by
many?240 Police are also given a free hand at interrogation of juveniles and the
mentally retarded. These disabled individuals are particularly good candidates
for either not comprehending their constitutional rights or for being induced to
confess to crimes they did not commit. As a result, they become subject to the
death penalty if convicted of capital murder based on such confessions.241
It is no coincidence that the principle of material truth, or the duty of the
organs of law enforcement to ascertain the truth, developed in a system which
used torture to compel confessions and which was characterized by its brutal
treatment not only of common criminals, but also of dissidents. Its goal was
punishment, not truth. Perhaps the best vehicle for ascertaining the truth is to
induce it with lenience, compassion or forgiveness. The approach taken by the
Republic of South Africa in granting amnesty to those guilty of horrendous
crimes during the reign of apartheid to those who honestly reveal their
complicity therein is an example which should be studied by American truthseekers. One could also study the Netherlands, which has an inquisitorial
system with no lay participation and a largely written trial, in which the great
bulk of all accused individuals confess. This occurs in the context of a liberal
society administered by more or less liberal, compassionate prosecutors and
judges.242
As long as the United States continues executing those who confess to
aggravated murders (most of whom are guilty) and imposing Draconian
sentences of deprivation of liberty in other felony cases, the American regime
of allowing police interrogations without any warnings in non-custody
situations and of custodial interrogations without counsel following waivers is
too susceptible to manipulation by police and prosecutors and should be
changed along the lines of the regime contemplated in the Italian Code of

240. The growing consensus around the world is that the death penalty itself violates human
rights. See ECHR, supra note 57, at Protocol 7. See also Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR.
(G.A. Res. No. 44/128, 15 December 1989), cited in BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 20.
241. The U.S. Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the execution of minors under eighteen years
of age and the mentally disabled have deservedly attracted severe condemnation from overseas.
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340
(1989). See also Thaman, America, supra note 226, at 1023.
242. Most Dutch defendants confess. An unpublished study of this phenomenon by the MaxPlanck-Institute for Foreign and International Comparative Law in 1978 found that the reason for
the Dutch defendant’s readiness to confess is to some extent attributable to the fact that Dutch
judges do not always impose the maximum sentence and “handle cases with socially integrative
notions and without emotions.” The sentences are exceptionally more lenient in type of sanction,
and magnitude thereof, than in Germany. Not so much is at stake. He can accept what awaits
him. He thus accepts punishment.
See Ingrid Van de Reyt, Niederlande, in DIE
BEWEISAUFNAHME IM STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT DES AUSLANDS 284, 314 (Walter Perron, ed.,
1995).
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Criminal Procedure.243 Once we join the rest of the civilized world and begin
treating our criminals as our children; once we recognize that they have
become criminals only after being raised in our families, our neighborhoods
and having gone to our schools and churches, only then can we begin treating
them compassionately and trying to address the root of the problem with
something other than repression. When those who violate the law realize they
will be treated fairly and compassionately and receive a humane punishment
for their crimes which will allow a possibility of rehabilitation and
reintegration into the community, maybe then they will be more likely to speak
the truth.244

243. See supra text accompanying note 76.
244. And in this respect, a system of compassionate sentence bargaining, which would reward
an honest acceptance of truth with a humane sentence, could be considered not as an end run
around due process, but, with due participation of the victim in cases where there is one (most of
our sentenced prisoners have committed victimless crimes), as a restoration of the judicial peace
and a step towards reconciliation of offender with the victim and society. On this approach, see
Weigend, Reform, supra note 236, at 493-501. See also Roxin, supra note 84, at 195-96.

